

MONASH UNIVERSITY

A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOSITY
AMONGST A GROUP OF AUSTRALIAN MUSLIMS
LIVING IN VICTORIA AND NEW SOUTH WALES

PAPER PRESENTED AT THE AUSTRALASIAN CONFERENCE ON ISLAM
'MUSLIM IDENTITY FORMATION IN RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES'
25-26 NOVEMBER 2013
SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA

CENTRE FOR ISLAM & THE MODERN WORLD

BY
RACHEL WOODLOCK

24/10/2013

ABSTRACT

Islamic religiosity appears threatening to vocal critics amongst Western politicians, journalists and social commentators, but this raises the question: how do religious Australian Muslims—and it must be stated that not all Muslims are religious—go about practising Islam in their everyday lives? Do Australian Muslims who claim that religion is important to them, live more religious lives than those for whom religion is not as important? These are questions animating the research presented in this paper. Its aim is to provide a descriptive analysis of Islamic religious practice as reported by a group of Muslims over the age of 16, living in New South Wales and Victoria between March 2007 and May 2008. It takes a multidisciplinary approach, because despite decades of interesting and valuable research, there is no single, universal model of religiosity that can explain and predict religiosity. In line with previous research, it found that religious salience—in regards Muslims who self-report that religion is important in their lives—is correspondingly associated with higher levels of religious behaviours such as regularly praying all five prayers; usually praying ‘on time’; (for men) praying at the mosque; more frequently attending religious meetings; abstaining from forbidden types of food and drink, wearing Islamic clothing; and seeking guidance from local religious leaders.

A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOSITY
AMONGST A GROUP OF AUSTRALIAN MUSLIMS
LIVING IN VICTORIA AND NEW SOUTH WALES

Introduction

The settlement and integration of Australian Muslims have been topics of interest in political debate as well as in academia. Although there has been much research on Muslims' experiences of cultural and racial discrimination and prejudice, it is often Islamic religiosity that popular discourse presents as the central problem impeding Muslim assimilation. Put crudely: if Muslims would stop being followers of Islam, they could become proper Australians.

It follows, then, that understanding Australian Muslims' religiosity and religious identity is the first step to either unmask this popular sentiment as being merely Islamophobic, or to discover whether there really is a problem with religious Muslims in Australia. The aim of this paper is to provide a descriptive analysis of Islamic religious practice amongst a group of Muslims over the age of 16, living in New South Wales and Victoria.

Studying Religiosity

Studying any concept requires it first be defined and delineated. Unfortunately religion and religiosity are words taken for granted as obvious, when they are instead pointers to nebulous phenomena. As psychologist William James, the great scholar of religious experience, wrote: 'the very fact that they are so many [definitions] and so different from one another is enough to prove that the word "religion" cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name.'¹ Still, definitions of religion, where provided and not already presumed, touch on ideas around the attempt to answer existential questions of ultimate meaning, recognition (usually) of a supernatural realm, and shared attitudes and behaviours that mark boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, even if these are loosely-shared and difficult to precisely delineate.

For Muslims, the group of interest in the present research, the word usually translated as ‘religion’ is the Arabic word *dīn*, which carries connotations of the debt of belief, worship and obedience that human beings owe to God, in gratitude for their continuing existence. It is fully expressed in the specific revelation of Islam given to the prophet Muhammad and exemplified by him.² On the basis of a famous tradition,³ Islam as a religion has three dimensions:

1. *islām*—submission to God’s will through performance of the five ‘pillars’. That is, to bear witness to the peerless unicity of God and Muhammad’s station as God’s messenger; to pray the five daily prayers; to fast during Ramadan; to pay the alms-tax; and to perform the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime, if able.
2. *imān*—essential truths about the nature of reality. Islam teaches the existence of one, unique, creator God; an angelic realm; that God has sent prophets to humankind, bearing his revelations; in a future day of judgement in which all will be held to account; and that God has timeless knowledge of all things.
3. *ihsān*—to do what is beautiful. This is a difficult concept to translate, but essentially means to perfect the first two dimensions of religion, so that one lives in complete harmony with the divine will.

Although these are widely recognised as Islam’s essential beliefs and practices, the extent to which Muslims hold and observe them is a separate issue. That is, there is Islam in its theoretical ideal as defined by Islamic scholars, and there is the reality of how Muslims actually live; this paper is concerned with the latter.

As for defining religiosity, despite decades of interesting and useful research, there is no consensus on whether there can be constructed a universally applicable model defining, explaining and predicting it. It seems the disagreement springs from the more fundamental issue that different researchers from different disciplines are capturing different aspects of human experience. This is obvious at the discipline level, with psychology-based studies more interested in quantitative measurement of individual religiosity, sociology-based studies more interested in qualitatively

understanding religiosity as a societal group phenomenon, and political scientists more interested in religiosity's role in power dynamics between groups.

For the purposes of the current research, however, I rely on Jörg Stolz's distinction of religion being a cultural phenomenon which is the 'whole of cultural symbol-systems that respond to problems of meaning and contingency by alluding to a transcendent reality which influences everyday life but cannot be directly controlled' and religiosity as the '*individual* preferences, emotions, beliefs, and actions that refer to an existing (or self-made) religion.'⁴ But before presenting and analysing the data on a group of Australian Muslims, the next section covers important stages and themes in the previous research on religiosity.⁵ Because there is no universal model that explains and predicts religiosity, this paper notes the particular disciplines and methodologies used by researchers, in order to discover which may be useful in the attempt to understand Australian Muslim religiosity. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach permits us to simultaneously take an expansive look at the general trends that have arisen in religiosity research, and zoom in to specific ideas applicable to the current research aim.

The Psychology of Religiosity

Groundbreaking work on the psychology of religiosity was conducted in the mid-twentieth century by Gordon W. Allport who, along with colleagues, developed the concepts of *Intrinsic* and *Extrinsic* religiosity, the former being an internalised, fulfilling, affirming type of religiosity that a person pursues for its own sake, and the latter being outward adherence to religious conventions to serve some other purpose.⁶ 'The extrinsically motivated person *uses* his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated *lives* his religion.'⁷ C. Daniel Batson with colleagues added a third *Quest* dimension of religiosity in which a person is motivated by existential spiritual questioning even if the answers are elusive.⁸ Yet, others cast doubt on whether *Quest* offers any conceptual clarity.⁹

Later research also confirmed that despite conceptual refinements that divided the *Intrinsic-Extrinsic* scale into a four-fold typology,¹⁰ these are better described as different facets of religiosity, rather than belonging to a single spectrum. Michael J. Donahue noted: 'Means, end, and quest are certainly three separate, orthogonal, replicable dimensions, but they may not be all the dimensions of

religiousness.¹¹ He found in his meta-analysis of the literature, that extrinsic religiosity tended to be positively correlated with undesirable traits such as dogmatism and prejudice, whereas intrinsic religiosity was uncorrelated with the same. Instead, intrinsic religiosity tended to be positively correlated with variables demonstrating religiousness, whereas extrinsic religiosity does not. He made the subtle distinction that what was being defined as extrinsicness was really an attitude *towards* religion, rather than being a type of genuine religiosity. He wryly observed that it ‘does a good job of measuring the sort of religion that gives religion a bad name.’¹²

Religiosity as a Multi-Dimensional Phenomenon

Religiosity as a multi-dimensional phenomenon was the focus of research done by Charles Y. Glock and other trailblazers in the field.¹³ Much was written by them debating the number and types of dimensions, each researcher proposed models revolving around distinctions between the motivations for religious behaviour, beliefs, practices, knowledge, experiences, and the effects of religiosity in everyday life. One of the most commonly cited models comes from *American Piety*, in which Glock and Rodney Stark delineated five dimensions:

1. *Belief* — Holding a set of religious tenets one believes to be true.
2. *Practice* — Engaging in acts of ritual worship and devotion, either publically (such as attending church) or privately (such as informal praying).
3. *Knowledge* — Possessing knowledge of the basic tenets, rites, scriptures and traditions of one’s religion.
4. *Experience* — A sense of contact, even fleeting, with a supernatural agency.
5. *Consequences* — The effect of the other dimensions on one’s everyday life.¹⁴

Yet, critics of the multi-dimensional models pointed to confusion in the levels of abstraction, overlap in categories, possibly high inter-correlation of variables, temporal fuzziness, difficulties in scaling the variables, and whether the captured activities were really describing social behaviours unrelated to religion.¹⁵ Glock and Stark themselves already noted that the different dimensions were not correlated strongly enough to be able to make predictions about other dimensions of religiosity by simply

measuring one dimension. ‘These empirical findings require that the dimensions of religious commitment be treated as related, but distinct, manifestations of piety.’¹⁶

A number of subsequent researchers have attempted to shift the focus onto religiosity as a singular phenomenon or to prioritise one facet such as salience—the self-reported importance of religion. Richard L. Gorsuch and Sam G. McFarland were able to confirm that a single item for religious salience could be used to measure *General Religiosity* or an ‘intrinsically proreligious attitude’,¹⁷ a finding also confirmed by Riaz Hassan, Carolyn Corkindale and Jessica Sutherland in their cross-country study which assessed whether self-reported levels of religiosity in Muslims correlated with a constructed marker of *Religious Intensity*.¹⁸ This paper similarly confirms the utility of salience as a marker of higher levels of religious behaviour, as will be seen.

Sociology of Religiosity

Marie Cornwall as a sociologist, used network theory to hypothesise that the number and strength of in-group ties affect the magnitude of religious belief and behaviour, whereas out-group ties reduce religious belief and behaviour.¹⁹ Her questionnaire asked items that produced four measures of religious belief and commitment, with two scales measuring *Personal Religiosity*, and two scales measuring *Institutional Religiosity*. Her dependent variables were: frequency of personal prayer, frequency of church attendance, and frequency of home religious observance. She analysed five factors that influenced religious behaviour amongst American Latter-day Saints (Mormons): group involvement; belief-orthodoxy; religious commitment; religious socialization; and sociodemographic characteristics. The variables in the last category she looked at were: marital status; education status; gender; age; and place of residence. She found these all influenced religious behaviour, but did so indirectly by affecting the nature of the in-group and/or out-group ties individuals possessed. Families were particularly important, as they ‘channeled’ individuals into religious groups, which perpetuated beliefs and commitment. Of interest to the current paper, Cornwall challenged the presumption that it is belief-orthodoxy that strongly influences behaviour, positing that group involvement (e.g. through attendance) is what develops belief formation.²⁰ In short, religious commitment influences group

involvement, which influences belief-orthodoxy, which influences religious behaviour. This suggests religiosity has to be actively nourished.

Individuals may also adapt their religiosity in new environments, as Frank van Tubergen, also a sociologist, argued using social integration theory. In his large-scale, cross-sectional survey of heads of households for four immigrant groups settling in the Netherlands, he found that immigrants adjusted their religiosity when moving from a highly religious sending nation to a highly secular receiving nation, the extent of which depended on the context of the immigrant's new social setting context.²¹ Van Tubergen tested a variety of independent variables for their influence on three aspects of religiosity: *Affiliation*, *Attitudes*, and *Participation*. The variables were: the percentage of non-Western immigrants in the settling neighbourhood; partner's ethnicity; ethnicity of social contacts; employment status; place of education; language proficiency; age at migration; length of settlement; ethnicity of immigrants; and gender. Van Tubergen's confirmed hypothesis was that stronger social inclusion in a more secular society moderates the religiosity of immigrants, which aligns with Cornwall's thesis about in-group and out-group ties influencing religiosity. This is relevant to the present research, as the population of Australian Muslims is similarly predominantly composed of immigrants and their children, living in a largely secular setting.

The difficulty that van Tubergen's research presents, is that there was no measure for salience, which Dale W. Wimberley found was linked with *Intrinsic* religiosity, and showed is likely to correlate with adherence to religious behaviours, even when conflicting with other societal norms.²² It is possible that extrinsically religious individuals—those who use religion to meet non-religious needs, rather than live religiously for its own sake—may jettison some or much of their religiosity where such an identity conflicts with the new surrounding environment.

Wimberley's theoretical paper reconceptualised religiosity based on social-psychological theories of symbolic interactionism and cognitive behaviourism. To explain: the self is formed through social interactions. That is, an individual performs various roles—mother, teacher, Muslim etc.—based on shared norms of appropriate behaviour, internalised as identities, the interplay of which constitutes

the self. The various identities are arranged in an internal hierarchy, which is possible to measure through the extent to which the norms of a particular identity are given performative preference at the point in which they contradict each other.²³

Wimberley defined religiosity as a type of role-identity that is composed of two interrelated components: a) *Religious Norm Adherence* and b) *Religious Identity Salience*. *Religious Norm Adherence* is multi-dimensional and, at least in Western Christianity, relates to the dimensions that previous researchers have described, such as belief orthodoxy, ritual involvement, devotionism, experience, and religious knowledge. The other component, *Religious Identity Salience*, is unidimensional and is the degree to which an individual places their religious identity above other role identities. The relevance to the present research is that Wimberley posits we can measure religiosity through measuring *Norm Adherence*. That is ‘the degree to which an individual adheres to the normative expectations of his or her religious group.’²⁴

Performance of norms, however, is affected by perceived rewards and costs, which can be internal (e.g. the belief that God rewards or punishes for adherence or violation of norms) or external (e.g. peer pressure, or state-imposed rewards or sanctions). Nevertheless, as Wimberley argued, where *Religious Identity Salience* is high, that is, it is manifested as *Intrinsic* religiosity, ‘sanctions should be unnecessary to maintain adherence to the religious role.’²⁵

Where *Religious Identity Salience* is high it likely causes greater *Norm Adherence*. But in societies where the cost for rejecting religious norms is high (e.g. Myanmar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Vatican City) salience most likely plays a reduced role. In Australia, the situation is reversed, with greater social costs incurred for public adherence to Islamic religious norms than for jettisoning them.²⁶ It may be expected, then, that *Religious Identity Salience* plays a more important role in Australian Muslim religiosity. This also demonstrates why studying religious groups in various settings is important.

Although requiring different testing scales be developed, this approach nevertheless has flexibility in allowing for different stresses various religious groups place on orthodoxy vs. orthopraxy. In religions that are more orthopraxic than orthodoxic, such as Islam, it makes more sense to focus on

performance of behaviours than content of theological beliefs. For Muslims in Australia, adherence to theological orthodoxy carries little risk—you can believe what you like about Allah, Prophet Muhammad, or any Islamic theological doctrine—but as mentioned previously, adherence to public religious behaviours carries much greater stigma. Therefore, the latter is more likely to indicate religiosity strength than content of theological beliefs.

Studying Non-Christian Religiosity

Non-Christian forms of religiosity are relatively under-studied and often misunderstood, partly because most researchers studying beliefs and behaviours have, until recently, focused on Christians or people living in nations with Christian majorities.²⁷ Although the holy grail of religiosity measurement has been the universally-applicable model,²⁸ simply overlaying the model derived from studying one group onto another runs the risk of missing important differences and generating skewed results.

One possible misplaced focus is on the weight given to the cognitive belief dimension of religiosity. Western researchers looking at Christian populations often focused on adherence to beliefs and inner mental states as important markers of religiosity.²⁹ Whilst historically Christianity has been very interested in questions of orthodoxy, some of the other major religions place greater emphasis on orthopraxy. In the case of Islam, while much ink has been spilled by Muslim scholars defining the boundaries of acceptable belief, the ultimate criterion for what makes someone a Muslim has always been whether she observes the five pillars of practice.³⁰

Whereas in Christianity acceptance of the catholic creeds has been the basic criterion [for membership in the community], in Islam credal theology has been of less relative importance; adherence to the Holy Law is the characteristic manifestation of faith, and hence orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy has been the usual token of membership.³¹

Consequently, religiosity models that over-emphasise the cognitive dimension are inappropriate for some non-Christian religions.

Yet, even comparing religious behaviours can be problematic. A specific example of where Western/Christian derived models of religiosity may be inappropriate to merely overlay onto non-Christian populations, is that of church attendance, with the expectation that the more religious a

person is, the more likely they are to attend services more frequently. However, this marker may not capture the religiosity of many Muslim women, depending on a variety of factors such as whether they belong to ethnicities that have traditionally dissuaded women from mosque-attendance, as well as the varying gender policies of local mosques. It may well also miss the religiosity of Muslim men who live in places where there is no easy access to mosques, and where the broader society is not set-up to cater to Friday as a day of worship.

Because of the important differences in how religiosity is manifested in non-Christian religions and among various societies and cultures, researchers have begun to recognise the need to develop models sensitive to cross-cultural and cross-religious diversity.³² They have also admitted the need to consider carefully the diversity that exists within religions. Although Catholic versus Protestant differences have long been acknowledged for Christianity,³³ it has unfortunately been common for Western scholars across many disciplines to homogenise non-Christian groups, attributing stereotypical characteristics to every member, or simply ignoring internal diversity. Anthropologist Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach pointed out qualitative research on the cultural variations of sub-groups demonstrates the need to be sensitive to differences. Even recognising Sunni and Shi'i variations is not enough. She gave the example of Azeri Shi'i Muslims who have a different culture, language and history to Iranian Shi'i Muslims. The secular nature of Azerbaijan and its history under Soviet-enforced atheism must be taken into consideration in comparing the religiosity of Azeri Shi'is with Shi'i Muslims from theocratic Iran.³⁴ This is a particularly relevant point for the current research, given the wide ethnic, linguistic, sectarian etc. diversity that exists among Muslims in Australia.

Studying Muslim Religiosity

Although as mentioned previously, most religiosity research has dealt with Christians' experiences, Muslim religiosity has begun to come to the attention of researchers, particularly given the political and media attention on Muslims involved in global crisis events, and the increasing permanent settlement of Muslims in Western nations. Some research has focused on Muslims living in Muslim-majority contexts,³⁵ whilst other research has dealt with Muslims living as minorities in North America

and Europe.³⁶ Furthermore, some research used the models developed whilst studying Christian religiosity, whilst others attempted to develop their own measures of Islamic religiosity, and yet others used a mixture of both.

Of the more recent attempts using the *Intrinsic*, *Extrinsic* & *Quest* ideas was Chang-Ho C. Ji and Yodi Ibrahim's study of religiosity among a sample of Indonesian Muslim university students. The authors also constructed a measure of adherence to what they defined as *Islamic Orthodoxy*—the degree to which participants assented to 'basic Islamic doctrines on Allah, Mohammed the Prophet, the Koran, last judgment' and the five pillars.³⁷ In line with previous research, Ji and Ibrahim confirmed *Intrinsic*, *Extrinsic* and *Quest* forms of religiosity as separate, continuous dimensions. They found a positive correlation between higher levels of doctrinal orthodoxy and increased religious activity but did not attempt to explain the direction of influence. Also, they found only a weak correlation between *Islamic Orthodoxy* and the three dimensions: 'Muslim religious orientations are not readily predictable from traditional Islamic doctrinal faith.'³⁸

Another psychology-based project was undertaken by Asma Jana-Masri and Paul E. Priester who developed and tested a Qur'an-derived religiosity scale measuring the dimensions: *Religious Belief Orthodoxy* and *Ritual Practices*.³⁹ They were critical of previous scales that included non-Qur'anic questions (i.e. that reflect a political belief). But their methodology presumed that all Islamic religiosity must be derived from the Qur'an. It is more likely, however, that Muslims' religiosity is complex and derived from other non-Qur'anic sources as well.

Of particular interest because it confirms previous research and can point to an important direction in future research assessing Muslim religiosity, is that Jana-Masri and Priester included a separate question measuring religious salience, asking participants to rate the importance of religion in life with a 5-point Likert-type scale. They discovered strong positive relationships of salience with both the *Belief Orthodoxy* and *Ritual Practices* sub-scales.⁴⁰ Also of interest is they found, with their admittedly small sample of 71 participants, that those identifying as ethnically Middle-Eastern scored higher for religiosity than those of other ethnic backgrounds.⁴¹ The authors did not speculate whether this is

because Middle Eastern Muslims are more religious, or because they over-report their religiosity.

The issue of cultural differences in reporting religiosity was raised by Hassan, Corkindale and Sutherland in their large-scale survey.⁴² Theirs was a unique contribution, in that their research was a) specifically designed for Muslim participants, and to assess Islamic religiosity, and b) was multi-national and cross-cultural. The authors compared a single-item question designed to reveal self-reported religiosity with a scale they constructed for *Religious Intensity*. The weakness of their method was its emphasis on beliefs to measure intensity, many of which reflected a particular conservative interpretation of Islamic beliefs. This unfortunately neglected alternative (e.g. modernist or contextualist) interpretations, and by design could not capture strongly practising individuals—those who fast, pray, attend mosque etc.—who nevertheless hold more secular or liberal religious attitudes.

However, it is of interest that they found the social environment affects how individuals self-report their level of religiosity. In particular, Southeast Asian Muslims are less likely to use ‘extreme’ adjectives in self-reporting levels of religiosity, and nation states with current or formerly enforced secularism tend to produce less intensity in individuals reporting religiosity.⁴³ They speculated that different countries have varying levels of ‘normal’ religiosity, so individuals can over- or underestimate their level of religiosity.⁴⁴ Put simply, individuals are acclimatised to the religious temperature of the surrounding culture, and consider that to be the ‘normal’ standard against which they measure themselves.

In conclusion, whilst there has been an interesting start to examining Muslim religiosity, there is need for further research looking at the religiosity of Muslims living as minorities, especially given that permanent settlement of Muslims in secular, democratic countries is both perceived to be problematic, and yet is increasing.

Methodology

Data Gathering

The current research is my analysis of data I helped gather for the Australian Research Council Linkage Project *Muslim Voices: Hopes & Aspirations of Australian Muslims*, via a questionnaire with both

open- and closed-ended questions covering a number of topics including religious salience and practice as well as wellbeing and happiness; living in Australia; relationship with country of origin for immigrants; values and characteristics; relationships and leisure; work and employment; education; economics; and background demographic information.⁴⁵ Techniques to minimise social desirability bias in this research included anonymity for participants; using both open-ended and closed-ended questions; using a variety of different scales for answers; keying the scales in different directions; and through careful sentence construction.

Participants

Data collection took place during the period of March 2007 to May 2008, yielded a dataset of 572 cases for analysis after quality control checks eliminated unusable questionnaires. The vast majority of questionnaires were completed in English, although a small number were translated from Arabic and Turkish by native speakers with university-level English fluency. Tables 1 and 2 give basic demographic information about the participants.

Although the sampling procedure was not designed to provide statistically representative numbers, I sought and achieved a broad spread of opinions and views from Australian-born Muslims, migrants, refugees, those in their late teens, young adults, mature adults, Sunnis, Shi'is, Sufis, converts, as well as those with different approaches to interpreting and living Islam.⁴⁶ However, there were some areas of the Muslim population (e.g. incarcerated Muslims, speakers of languages other than Arabic or Turkish with no English language competency, those Muslims who do not attend any form of public or online Islamic fora, Muslims under 16 years old) that I did not canvass and therefore further research would need to be undertaken for their views and experiences to be heard.

Analysis

I conducted statistical analysis of the data with SPSS Statistics software, version 22. The following represents a descriptive analysis of the sample and the state of Islamic religiosity among them.

Table 1. Participants' demographic information

Variable	Frequency (%)	Variable	Frequency (%)
<i>Sex</i>		<i>Ancestry</i>	
Female	318 (55.6%)	West Asian	259 (45.3%)
Male	254 (44.4%)	South & Central Asian	108 (18.9%)
<i>Age-group at census</i>		North African	39 (6.8%)
Teens	107 (18.7%)	North-West European	32 (5.6%)
20s	246 (43.0%)	South-East Asian	24 (4.2%)
30s	112 (19.6%)	South & East European	21 (3.7%)
40s	59 (10.3%)	Oceanian	12 (2.1%)
>50s	43 (7.5%)	Sub-Saharan African	11 (1.9%)
Not stated	5 (0.9%)	North-East Asian	3 (0.5%)
<i>Marital status</i>		North American	2 (0.4%)
Single	230 (40.2%)	Not stated	61 (10.7%)
Married / de-facto	276 (48.3%)	<i>Annual gross income</i>	
Separated	8 (1.4%)	<\$25,000	196 (34.3%)
Divorced	18 (3.2%)	>\$25,000 <\$50,000	104 (18.2%)
Widowed	6 (1.1%)	>\$50,000 <\$75,000	89 (15.6%)
Not stated	34 (5.9%)	>\$75,000 <\$100,000	36 (6.3%)
<i>State</i>		>\$100,000	37 (6.5%)
Victoria	339 (59.3%)	Not stated	110 (19.2%)
New South Wales	233 (40.7%)	<i>Student status</i>	
<i>Migrant status</i>		Full- or part-time student	276 (48.3%)
Migrant	324 (56.6%)	Not currently studying	250 (43.7%)
Australian-born	198 (34.6%)	Not stated	46 (8.0%)
Not stated	50 (8.7%)	<i>Total sample size</i>	
		<i>n=572</i>	

Religious Salience

As discussed previously, religious salience has been shown to be a reliable marker for religiosity, and the questionnaire asked participants to answer: 'how important is religion in your personal life?' Only eighteen chose not to answer the question, and the substantial majority of the rest (63.5%) indicated that religion is 'extremely important' in their lives (see Figure 1). This means that the sample captured Muslims for whom religion is highly salient, and thus the conclusions drawn from analysing the data cannot be extrapolated to those Muslims who are not religious. Yet, because it is Muslim religiosity that is threatening to some in the community, it is precisely this section of the population that is of particular interest in the current research. A natural question, then, is does this self-reported high level of religiosity among the majority of the participants, correlate with religious activities?²⁴⁷

Table 2. Participants' demographic information, by sex.

Variable	Frequency (%)		
	Female	Male	Total
<i>Employment status</i>			
Employed	176 (55.3%)	180 (70.9%)	356 (62.2%)
Unemployed	120 (37.7%)	55 (21.7%)	175 (30.6%)
Not stated	22 (6.9%)	19 (7.5%)	41 (7.2%)
<i>Completed education</i>			
None	2 (0.6%)	2 (0.8%)	4 (0.7%)
Primary	13 (4.1%)	8 (3.1%)	21 (3.7%)
Secondary	109 (34.3%)	73 (28.7%)	182 (31.8%)
Trade qualification/apprenticeship	14 (4.4%)	21 (8.3%)	35 (6.1%)
Certificate/diploma	41 (12.9%)	20 (7.9%)	61 (10.7%)
Bachelor degree	100 (31.4%)	62 (24.4%)	162 (28.3%)
Master degree	25 (7.9%)	40 (15.7%)	65 (11.4%)
Doctorate	3 (0.9%)	7 (2.8%)	10 (1.8%)
Not stated	11 (3.5%)	21 (8.3%)	32 (5.6%)
<i>Convert status</i>			
Raised Muslim	266 (83.6%)	213 (83.9%)	479 (83.7%)
Convert	37 (11.6%)	21 (8.3%)	58 (10.1%)
Not stated	15 (4.7%)	20 (7.9%)	35 (6.1%)
<i>Total sample size</i>	<i>n</i> =318	<i>n</i> =254	<i>n</i> =572




Figure 1. Importance of religion in participants' lives.

Prayer

Ritual prayer five times a day—the second ‘pillar’—is a central Islamic practice. Each of the prayers, interspersed throughout the day and night, takes around five to ten minutes to pray and involves washing for ritual purity, facing the direction of the Ka’ba in Makka, and performing set words and

postures, preferably in congregation. Muslim scholars have always considered the ritual prayer a vital indicator of Islamicity, as the Prophet was reported to have said: ‘The first matter that the slave will be brought to account for on the Day of Judgment is the prayer. If it is sound, then the rest of his deeds will be sound. And if it is bad, then the rest of his deeds will be bad’ (al-Tabarani).

Participants were asked to indicate which, if any, of the five daily prayers they regularly performed and the usual location for performing the particular prayer (see Figure 2). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that it is very difficult to avoid social desirability bias with this question, the majority of participants (73.7% of the 539 who answered it) indicated they usually prayed all five prayers. It is evident by the location of where participants prayed, that integrating the ritual prayers into everyday life including at work and school is achievable and achieved by many. For example, of the 160 participants who indicated they were in full-time employment and usually prayed the *zuhr* noon-time prayer, 51.9% prayed *zuhr* at work. Of the 159 full-time students who indicated they usually pray *zuhr*, 41.5% prayed it at school.




Figure 2. Performance of daily ritual prayers.

Although praying the five daily prayers in congregation at the mosque is highly encouraged, even obligatory for men in certain circumstances, only minorities of the 397 Muslims who prayed all

prayers regularly were able to achieve this (see Table 3). That being said, nearly 32% of males usually praying the ‘*isha*’ night prayer indicated they prayed it at the mosque; they are a substantial minority and possibly a good indicator of high male religiosity for those who have easy access to mosques.⁴⁸

Table 3. Prayers usually performed at the mosque.

Prayer	Females (<i>n</i> =228)	Males (<i>n</i> =169)	Total (<i>n</i> =397)
<i>fajr/subh</i>	2 (0.9%)	28 (16.6%)	30 (7.6%)
<i>zuhr</i>	4 (1.8%)	19 (11.2%)	23 (5.8%)
<i>‘asr</i>	5 (2.2%)	14 (8.3%)	19 (4.8%)
<i>maghrib</i>	4 (1.8%)	38 (22.5%)	42 (10.6%)
<i>‘isha’</i>	5 (2.2%)	54 (32.0%)	59 (14.9%)

Because asking Muslims whether they pray or not risks invoking social desirability bias, the questionnaire also asked the more acceptable question of what extent participants were usually able to pray ‘on time’.⁴⁹ This gave psychological room for participants to avoid confessing a sin, mitigating against (although admittedly probably not completely eliminating) bias.




Figure 3. How often participants make their prayers ‘on time’.

Although 73.7% of participants said they usually prayed all five prayers, only 23.8% indicated they always pray ‘on time’ (see Figure 3). Because of the greater spread of results, this marker is a

better indicator of strength of religiosity.




Figure 4. Frequency of attendance at religious meetings.




Figure 5. Frequency of attendance at Friday prayers, by gender.




Figure 6. Percentage of Muslims attending religious meetings weekly and monthly, by gender.

Attending Religious Meetings

Australian Muslims have the opportunity to attend a variety of different religious meetings including (depending on availability) Friday *jum'ua* prayers at the mosque, talks by prominent local and overseas speakers, Islamic education meetings, Arabic language classes, converts support groups, *dhikr* prayer meetings,⁵⁰ and social gatherings. The questionnaire asked participants to nominate how frequently, if ever, they attended them. Social gatherings, Friday *jum'ua* prayers and Islamic talks or lectures were the most popular activities, attended frequently by sizeable proportions of the sample (see Figure 4).

Because the belief that Muslim women do not have to/should not attend *jum'ua* prayers is fairly widespread, it is important to differentiate between genders when looking at attendance rates. There is a clear sex distinction with 69% of men attending weekly and only 19% of women doing the same (see Figure 5). Given all attendance options, the Chi-square test for independence indicated a large and significant association, $\chi^2 (3, n=486) = 147.42, p < .000, V = .55$. This is not to say that women are not interested in attending religious services and meetings, because the gender disparity lessens considerably when looking at other types of religious gatherings, particularly at the weekly and monthly levels (see Figure 6).

There was no significant association between gender and attendance at spiritual meetings, Muslim social gatherings, educational meetings or Arabic language classes. There was, however, a small albeit significant association between gender and attendance at Islamic talks or lectures, $\chi^2 (4, n=525) = 10.9, p = .03, V = .14$, one possible reason being they may be linked with Friday prayers.

Food and Dress

The questionnaire asked participants to indicate if they followed a variety of different food and dress rules (see Figure 7). Dress is probably one of the most visible aspects of Islamic identity to the wider Australian public. There exists not a small amount of criticism over women's dress in particular, with semi-regular calls to ban face and/or headcovers. Much of this criticism is framed in terms of concern with women's freedom or terrorism fears, but is actually part of an Islamophobic and racist discourse.⁵¹ For all the newspaper headlines calling for the '*burqa*'⁵² to be banned as if it were a major

public menace, only fifteen Muslim women (4.7%) in the current research indicated they wore face-veils in public. Although with such a small group no generalisations can be made, it is interesting to note—given the rhetoric about face-veiling being foreign and un-Australian—that half were migrants and half Australian-born. Furthermore, four of the women were converts. Headcovers, however, were worn in public by nearly 60% of all Muslim women in the sample: a much more popular practice than face-veiling.




Figure 7. Percentage of participants following various food and dress rules.

Abstaining from pork and alcohol were the most observed rules. Some of the items described minority rulings within Islamic sacred law, for example avoiding some seafood or non-Muslim prepared food, and as expected these were not commonly followed among the Muslims sampled here. Other rules, such as men wearing beards, or abstaining from meat not slaughtered Islamically (*dhabihah*)

are common to all interpretations of sacred law, yet are not universally followed.

Religious Guidance

Australia does not have the specialist knowledge infrastructure that long-established Muslim-majority countries have where it comes to religious leadership and education. Imams—mosque prayer-leaders—have been called on to fulfil the roles of *muftis* (providers of religious legal opinions), *qadis* (judges), *mujtahids* (interpreters of sacred law), *mutakallims* (theologians), *pirs* (spiritual teachers), not to mention those roles usually expected of their Christian and Jewish counterparts such as counsellors, pastoral care-givers, community representatives, government liaisons, and more. However, with the advent of Internet technologies in particular, Australian Muslims have access to a wide variety of sources of religious guidance. This is not without risk, as international sources often lack the necessary local and contextual knowledge that has traditionally been required of those imparting religious guidance.

The questionnaire asked participants to nominate which, if any, sources of religious guidance they had consulted in the past (including an open-ended question to solicit alternative responses to those listed in the questionnaire). The listed options were:

- local imam / *shaykh* or *shaykha*⁵³
- Muslim religious leaders at official institutions outside Australia (such as in Saudi Arabia, al-Azhar or Qom)
- Muslim scholars or leaders on cable television
- Muslim scholars or leaders on the Internet
- national Muslim religious leaders in Australia
- trusted family member or friend
- other

Of the other sources that participants listed, the following were counted:

- scholars non-specific

- local Islamic school or group
- own study

Table 4. Sources of religious guidance previously consulted by participants.

Source	Females (<i>n</i> =318)	Males (<i>n</i> =254)	Total (<i>n</i> =572)
Local imam / shaykh or shaykha	189 (59.4%)	153 (60.2%)	342 (59.8%)
Official institutions outside Australia	60 (18.9%)	61 (24.0%)	121 (21.2%)
Cable television	48 (15.1%)	34 (13.4%)	82 (14.3%)
Internet	97 (30.5%)	72 (28.3%)	169 (29.5%)
National leaders in Australia	74 (23.3%)	60 (23.6%)	134 (23.4%)
Trusted family/friend	212 (66.7%)	166 (65.4%)	378 (66.1%)
Scholars non-specific	4 (1.3%)	2 (0.8%)	6 (1.0%)
Local Islamic school/group	2 (0.6%)	3 (1.2%)	5 (0.9%)
Own study	15 (4.7%)	11 (4.3%)	26 (4.5%)
Other - unspecified	8 (2.5%)	9 (3.5%)	17 (3.0%)

As is clear from Table 4 and Figure 8, gender has no discernable influence on the sources of religious guidance that the participants sought. There were two main sources of guidance for both men and women: their trusted family and friends as well as local imams, *shaykhs* and *shaykhas*. Religious scholars or leaders on the Internet, as well as national Australian leaders and those from official




Figure 8. Sources of religious guidance previously consulted by participants.

overseas institutions played smaller but not insubstantial roles. However, local sources of knowledge play a more prominent guiding role for Australian Muslims than other sources such as overseas authorities and those imparting guidance through the Internet and media. This is important because local scholars and leaders tend to have a much better grasp of the local context and environment that Australian Muslims find themselves in, and can (at least in theory) provide more suitable guidance for them. The gender parity in consulting sources of guidance means that women appear to have the same access to sources of knowledge as men.

Interpretations of Islam

Muslims take a variety of approaches to interpreting Islam, that for the purposes of this research have been divided into four main orientations: *Secularists*, *Traditionalists*, *Fundamentalists* and *Contextualists*. *Secularists* are those who argue for separation of religion and state and the privatisation of religion. *Traditionalists* are those who attempt to follow the pre-modern, traditional interpretations of theology and jurisprudence that developed over the centuries. *Fundamentalists* are those who argue that Muslims should return to the original ‘fundamentals’ of Islam—how they believe the Prophet and his early companions and successors lived.⁵⁴ Finally, *Contextualists* are those who believe that Islam should be continually reinterpreted depending on the unique circumstances of when and where Muslims live.⁵⁵

Participants were asked to choose between four statements that ‘most closely’ described their approach to the role of religion in society:

- a) ‘I think religion should be a private affair and have little or no role in the debate about the nature of our society’ (coded as *Secularist*).
- b) ‘I think Muslims should rely on the chain of traditional interpretations of Islam in understanding the role of Islam in society’ (coded as *Traditionalist*).
- c) ‘I think Muslims should return to the fundamentals of Islam as the source of authority for all political and social action’ (coded as *Fundamentalist*).
- d) ‘I think Muslims should interpret the role and nature of Islam in society in relation to the needs and contexts of the times’ (coded as *Contextualist*).

Traditionalists made up the largest group at 28.7% of the sample, followed closely by *Contextualists* with 26.6%, then *Fundamentalists* at 19.9%, and *Secularists* at 12.8%. Finally 12.1% of the sample declined to answer the question.

It is clear that the sample in the present research is, by and large, a sample of Australian Muslims for whom religion is relatively important and who live this in their levels of prayer-observance, attendance at religious meetings, observance of Islamic food and dress rules, the seeking of religious guidance, and for most affirming an important place for Islam in society.

Comparing Levels of Religiosity

Previously, the question of whether high levels of self-reported religious salience correlate with religious activities was posed. In order to test whether self-reported salience predicts greater adherence to religious behaviours, the participants were divided into two groups: those for whom religion is ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ important in their lives ($n=443$) and those for whom it was less than ‘very’ important ($n=111$). The former were coded as ‘more important’ and the latter ‘less important’. The 18 who did not answer the question on religious salience have been excluded from analysis here.

Chi-square tests for independence were run on variables to do with prayer; attending religious meetings; following Islamic food and dress rules; and seeking religious guidance, with hypotheses that higher religious salience would be significantly associated with increased levels of religious behaviours. This would confirm that the self-reported measure of religious salience correctly measures personal religiosity. Most of the hypotheses were confirmed, with some exceptions, albeit with varying levels of effect size (see Tables 5 through 11 for test results).

Table 5. Chi-square test for independence results for regular prayer habits.

Prayer	Chi-square test results
Praying the five daily prayers	$\chi^2 (5, n=535) = 109.29, p < .000, V = .45$
Praying ‘on time’	$\chi^2 (4, n=529) = 99.7, p < .000, V = .43$

Table 6. Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) results for the association between religious salience and males praying at the mosque.

Prayer	Chi-square test results
<i>fajr/subh</i>	$\chi^2 (1, n=224) = 5.70, p = .02, phi = .18$
<i>zuhr</i>	$\chi^2 (1, n=227) = 4.104, p = .04, phi = .15$
<i>'asr</i>	$\chi^2 (1, n=223) = 2.23, p = .14, phi = .12$
<i>maghrib</i>	$\chi^2 (1, n=223) = 9.22, p = .002, phi = .22$
<i>'isha'</i>	$\chi^2 (1, n=225) = 14.54, p < .000, phi = .27$

Table 7. Chi-square test for independence results for the association between religious salience and attendance at religious meetings.

Meeting	Chi-square test results
Arabic classes	$\chi^2 (4, n=445) = 30.59, p < .000, V = .26$ (3 cells with expected count <5)
Educational meetings	$\chi^2 (4, n=475) = 76.23, p < .000, V = .40$ (1 cell with expected count <5)
Muslim social gatherings	$\chi^2 (4, n=503) = 82.23, p < .000, V = .40$
Spiritual meetings	$\chi^2 (4, n=473) = 67.04, p < .000, V = .38$ (1 cell with expected count <5)

Table 8. Chi-square test for independence results for the association between religious salience and male and female attendance at Islamic talks or lectures and Friday *Jum'ua* prayers.

Meeting	Chi-square test results
Men at talks/lectures	$\chi^2 (4, n=224) = 55.22, p < .000, V = .50$ (1 cell with expected count <5)
Women at talks/lectures	$\chi^2 (4, n=292) = 65.06, p < .000, V = .47$ (2 cells with expected count <5)
Men's at <i>Jum'ua</i> prayers	$\chi^2 (4, n=224) = 49.28, p < .000, V = .47$ (4 cells with expected count <5)
Women at <i>Jum'ua</i> prayers	$\chi^2 (4, n=255) = 16.32, p = .003, V = .25$ (2 cells with expected count <5)

Table 9. Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) results for association between religious salience and following gender non-specific Islamic food and dress rules.

Rule	Chi-square test results
Abstaining from alcohol	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 46.52, p < .000, phi = -.30$
Abstaining from pork	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 5.37, p = .02, phi = -.01$
Abstaining from some seafood	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 1.73, p = .19, phi = -.06$
Eating only <i>dhabiha</i> meat	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 56.62, p < .000, phi = -.32$
Avoiding non-Muslim prep. food	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = .05, p = .83, phi = -.02$
Wearing loose, opaque, limb-covering clothing	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 44.71, p < .000, phi = -.29$
Avoiding opposite-sex clothing	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 54.58, p < .000, phi = -.32$
Avoiding non-Muslim clothing	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 6.16, p < .01, phi = -.11$

Table 10. Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) results for association between religious salience and following gender specific Islamic food and dress rules.

Rule	Chi-square test results
Men avoiding wearing gold	$\chi^2 (1, n=244) = 47.05, p < .000, phi = -.45$
Men avoiding wearing silk	$\chi^2 (1, n=244) = 46.11, p < .000, phi = -.45$
Men wearing beards	$\chi^2 (1, n=244) = 6.74, p = .01, phi = -.18$
Men wearing headcovers in prayer	$\chi^2 (df, n=244) = .01, p = .91, phi = -.02$
Women wearing face-veils in public	$\chi^2 (1, n=310) = 2.47, p = .12, phi = .11$
Women wearing headcovers in public	$\chi^2 (1, n=310) = 24.73, p < .000, phi = -.29$
Women wearing loose over-garments in public	$\chi^2 (1, n=310) = 4.16, p = .04, phi = -.13$

Table 11. Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) results for association between religious salience and seeking religious guidance.

Source	Chi-square test results
Local imam/ <i>shaykh/shaykha</i>	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 20.04, p < .000, phi = -.20$
Official institutions outside Australia	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 2.04, p = .15, phi = -.07$
Cable television	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = .03, p = .87, phi = -.01$
Internet	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 3.08, p = .08, phi = -.08$
National leaders in Australia	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = 2.33, p = .13, phi = -.07$
Trusted family/friend	$\chi^2 (1, n=554) = .02, p = .89, phi = -.01$

Higher religious salience is significantly associated with:

- regularly praying all five prayers
- usually praying ‘on time’
- males praying at the mosque for all prayers except the afternoon ‘*asr* prayer⁵⁶
- more frequent attendance at Arabic classes, religious educational meetings, and social gatherings with other Muslims and spiritual meetings
- more frequent attendance for both men and women at Friday *jum‘ua* prayers and Islamic talks or lectures
- abstaining from alcohol, pork, and meat that has not been slaughtered Islamically (*dhabihah*)
- wearing loose, opaque, limb-covering clothing
- avoiding wearing opposite-sex clothing and clothing that would mark them as non-Muslims
- men avoiding wearing gold and silk, but wearing beards
- women wearing headcovers and loose over-garments in public
- seeking religious guidance from local imams, *shaykhs* or *shaykhas*.

However, higher religious salience is *not* significantly associated with:

- abstaining from some forms of seafood or food prepared by non-Muslims
- men wearing headcovers during prayer
- women wearing face-veils in public

- seeking religious guidance from sources *other* than local imams, *shaykhs* or *shaykhas*.

As regards the four religio-political orientations for interpreting Islam's role in society, only being a *Secularist* was moderately but significantly associated with lower religious salience, as revealed by a Chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction), $\chi^2 (1, n=491) = 43.57, p < .000, phi = .31$.

In summary, this research describes the types of normative Islamic behaviours in which religious Australian Muslims are engaged and confirms that religious salience, in regards Muslims who self-report that religion is important in their lives, is correspondingly associated with higher levels of most of these religious behaviours. This finding allows for religious salience to be a marker by which to test whether religiosity is associated with a variety of other variables, for example levels of social inclusion and subjective and objective wellbeing, as suggested subjects of future research.

Notes

¹ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature; Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901–1902*, New York: Longmans, Green / Co., 1902, p.26, <http://goo.gl/KwbsXL>, accessed November 6, 2013.

² Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, *The Vision of Islam*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1994, pp.xxviii–xxxii.

³ Known as ‘Gabriel’s Hadith’ as it recounts the appearance of Gabriel in human form to Muhammad whilst he was sitting with his companions, in order to teach them their religion.

⁴ Jörg Stolz, “Explaining Religiosity: Towards a Unified Theoretical Model”, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2009, pp. 347, author’s emphasis.

⁵ Space does not permit me to comprehensively cover the history of religiosity research. For this the reader is recommended to peruse Jaak Billiet, “Proposal for Questions on Religious Identity”, in *Development of the Core Module*, European Social Survey, n.d., http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/questionnaire/core_questionnaire.html, and Peter C. Hill and Ralph W. Hood, eds., *Measures of Religiosity*, Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1999.

⁶ Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954; and Gordon W. Allport and J. Michael Ross, “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* Vol. 5, No. 4, 1967, pp. 432–443. Contemporaneously, Gerhard Lenski focused on religiosity in the form of denominational identities (Catholicism vs. Protestantism).

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 434, their emphasis.

⁸ C. Daniel Batson, “Religion as Prosocial: Agent or Double Agent?” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol.15, No. 1, 1976, pp. 29–45; C. Daniel Batson and W. Larry Ventis, *The Religious Experience: A Social-Psychological Perspective*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982; C. Daniel Batson and Patricia A. Schoenrade, “Measuring Religion as Quest: 1) Validity Concerns”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1991, pp. 416–429; and C. Daniel Batson and Patricia A. Schoenrade, “Measuring Religion as Quest: 2) Reliability Concerns”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1991, pp. 430–447.

⁹ Richard A. Hunt and Morton King, “The Intrinsic-Extrinsic Concept: A Review and Evaluation”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1971, pp. 339–356; Ralph W. Hood, “The Conceptualization of Religious Purity in Allport’s Typology”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1985, pp. 413–417; Michael J. Donahue, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiousness: Review and Meta-analysis”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1985, pp. 400–41; Richard D. Kahoe, “The Development of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientations”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1985, pp. 408–412; and Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Ralph W. Hood, “Intrinsic-Extrinsic Religious Orientation: The Boon or Bane of Contemporary Psychology of Religion?” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1990, pp. 442–462.

¹⁰ Those who scored high in agreement with intrinsic items but not extrinsic ones were designated as *Intrinsic*s; those who scored high in agreement with extrinsic items but not intrinsic ones were *Extrinsic*s; those who scored high in agreement with both intrinsic and extrinsic items were *Indiscriminately Proreligious*; and those who failed to score in agreement with either intrinsic or extrinsic items were *Indiscriminately Anti/Nonreligious* Allport and Ross, “Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice”.

¹¹ Donahue, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiousness”, p. 413.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 416.

¹³ Yoshio Fukuyama, “The Major Dimensions of Church Membership”, *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1961, pp. 154–161; Joseph E. Faulkner and Gordon F. de Jong, “Religiosity in 5-D: An Empirical Analysis”, *Social Forces*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1966, pp. 246–254; Morton King,

“Measuring the Religious Variable: Nine Proposed Dimensions”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1967, pp. 173–190; Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, *American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968; Joseph H. Fichter, “Sociological Measurement of Religiosity”, *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1969, pp. 169–177; Morton B. King, “Measuring the Religious Variable: Amended Findings”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1969, pp. 321–323; Harold S. Himmelfarb, “Measuring Religious Involvement”, *Social Forces*, Vol. 53, No. 4, 1975, pp. 606–618; Gordon F. de Jong, Joseph E. Faulkner, and Rex H. Warland, “Dimensions of Religiosity Reconsidered: Evidence from a Cross-Cultural Study”, *Social Forces*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1976, pp. 866–889; and Morton B. King and Richard A. Hunt, “Measuring the Religious Variable: Final Comment”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1990, pp. 531–535.

¹⁴ Stark and Glock, *American Piety*. Note that the last dimension was not analysed in the book.

¹⁵ James O. Gibbs and Kelly W. Crader, “A Criticism of Two Recent Attempts to Scale Glock and Stark’s Dimensions of Religiosity: A Research Note”, *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1970, pp. 107–114; Himmelfarb, “Measuring Religious Involvement”; and G.H. Mueller, “The Dimensions of Religiosity,” *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1980, pp. 1–24.

¹⁶ Stark and Glock, *American Piety*, p. 181.

¹⁷ Richard L. Gorsuch and Sam G. McFarland, “Single vs. Multiple-Item Scales for Measuring Religious Values”, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1972, p. 63.

¹⁸ Riaz Hassan, Carolyn Corkindale, and Jessica Sutherland, “The Reality of Religious Labels: A Study of Muslim Religiosity”, *Australian Religion Studies Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2008, pp. 188–99.

¹⁹ Marie Cornwall, “The Determinants of Religious Behavior: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Test”, *Social Forces*, Vol. 68, No. 2, 1989, p. 575.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 576.

²¹ Frank van Tubergen, “Religious Affiliation and Participation among Immigrants in a Secular Society: A Study of Immigrants in The Netherlands”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2007, p. 749.

²² Dale W. Wimberley, “Religion and Role-Identity: A Structural Symbolic Interactionist Conceptualization of Religiosity”, *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1989, pp. 125–142.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Isma‘-Listen: National Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice Against Arab and Muslim Australians*, Report, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004; Tanja Dreher, ‘Targeted’: Experiences of Racism in NSW After September 11, 2001, UTS Shopfront Research Monograph Series, No. 2, Sydney: UTSePress, 2006; Kevin M. Dunn, Natascha Klocker, and Tanya Salabay, “Contemporary Racism and Islamophobia in Australia: Racializing Religion”, *Ethnicities*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2007, pp. 564–589; Samina Yasmeen, *Understanding Muslim Identities: From Perceived Relative Exclusion to Inclusion*, Report, Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, May 2008.

²⁷ See Asma Jana-Masri and Paul E. Priester, “The Development and Validation of a Qur’an-Based Instrument to Assess Islamic Religiosity: The Religiosity of Islam Scale”, *Journal of Muslim Mental Health*, Vol. 2, 2007, pp. 177–188 for a brief but useful criticism of attempts to measure Islamic religiosity.

²⁸ King, “Measuring the Religious Variable: Nine”; King and Hunt, “Measuring the Religious Variable: Final”; and Donahue, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiousness.”

²⁹ Cornwall, “Determinants of Religious Behavior.”

³⁰ The Qur’an itself differentiates between Muslims who submit to the will of God having entered Islam, and the subset of those Muslims who may legitimately call themselves ‘believers’ because faith has entered their hearts (Qur’an 49:14).

- ³¹ P.M. Holt, "Introduction", in *Cambridge History of Islam: The Central Islamic Lands from Pre-Islamic Times to the First World War*, eds. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, Vol. 1A, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. xii–xiii.
- ³² Besheer Mohamed, *The Implications of Religious Identity for American Muslims*, Thesis, Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 2011; Hassan, Corkindale, and Sutherland, "The Reality of Religious Labels"; Jana-Masri and Priester, "Development and Validation"; Chang-Ho C. Ji and Yodi Ibrahim, "Islamic Doctrinal Orthodoxy and Religious Orientations: Scale Development and Validation", *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2007, pp. 189–208.
- ³³ Even then, it is important to recognise the diversity that exists within Christian denominations themselves.
- ³⁴ Dobroszlawa Wiktor-Mach, "Measuring Muslims: The Problems of Religiosity and Intra-Religious Diversity", in *Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion: New Methods in the Sociology of Religion*, eds. Luigi Berzano and Ole Preben Riis, Vol. 3, Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp. 207–228.
- ³⁵ Abdulaziz Abdurrahman Albelaikhi, *Development of a Muslim Religiosity Scale*, Thesis, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Rhode Island, 1997; Nima Ghorbani, P.J. Watson, Ahad Framarz Ghramaleki, Ronald J. Morris, and Ralph W. Hood, "Muslim Attitudes Towards Religion Scale: Factors, Validity and Complexity of Relationships with Mental Health in Iran", *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2000, pp.125–132; Nima Ghorbani, P.J. Watson, Ahad Framarz Ghramaleki, Ronald J. Morris, and Ralph W. Hood, "Muslim-Christian Religious Orientation Scales: Distinctions, Correlations, and Cross-Cultural Analysis in Iran and the United States", *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2002, pp. 69–91; Steven E. Krauss, Azimi H. Hamzah, Turiman Suandi, Sidek M. Noah, Rumaya Juhari, Jamiah H. Manap, and Khairul Mastor, Hasnan Kassin, and Azma Mahmood, "Exploring Regional Differences in Religiosity Among Muslim Youth in Malaysia", *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2006, pp. 238–252; Steven Eric Krauss, Azimi H. Hamzah, and Fazila Idris, "Adaption of a Muslim Religiosity Scale for Use with Four Different Faith Communities in Malaysia", *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2007, pp. 147–164; Riaz Hassan, "On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies", *Muslim World*, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007, pp. 437–478; Ji and Ibrahim, "Islamic Doctrinal Orthodoxy"; Chang-Ho Ji and Yodi Ibrahim, "Islamic Religiosity in Right-Wing Authoritarian Personality: The Case of Indonesian Muslims", *Review of Religious Research*, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2007, pp. 128–146; Hassan, Corkindale, and Sutherland, "The Reality of Religious Labels"; Habib Tiliouine, Robert A. Cummins, and Melanie Davern, "Islamic Religiosity, Subjective Wellbeing, and Health", *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2009, pp. 55–74; and Zhuo Chen, Nima Ghorbani, P.J. Watson, Naser Aghababaei, "Muslim Experiential Religiousness and Muslim Attitudes Toward Religion: Dissociation of Experiential and Attitudinal Aspects of Religiosity in Iran", *Studia Religiologica*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2013, pp. 41–50.
- ³⁶ Jana-Masri and Priester, "Development and Validation"; Hisham Abu Raiya, *A Psychological Measure of Islamic Religiousness: Evidence for Relevance, Reliability and Validity*, Thesis, Doctor of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, 2008; and Mohamed, *Implications of Religious Identity*.
- ³⁷ Ji and Ibrahim, "Islamic Doctrinal Orthodoxy", p. 194.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 205.
- ³⁹ Jana-Masri and Priester, "Development and Validation".
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 182.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 182–183.
- ⁴² Hassan, Corkindale, and Sutherland, "The Reality of Religious Labels".
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 197.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ The project was headed by Professor Emeritus Gary D. Bouma (Monash University) and Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh (The University of Melbourne).

⁴⁶ If this were a simple random sample, the calculated sample size needed to achieve a 95 percent confidence level ($p = .05$) would be 384, based on the combined Victorian and NSW Muslim population 372,155 as assessed at the 2011 Australian Census of Population and Housing, Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Table Builder, 2011,” 2011, accessed December 11, 2013. See the National Statistical Service Sample Size Calculator website, National Statistical Service, “Sample Size Calculator”, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013, <http://goo.gl/is1ILC>, accessed December 11, 2013.

⁴⁷ Because it is the visibility of Muslim behaviours that appears threatening and draws stigma from sections of the Australian public, rather than the invisible content of theological beliefs, I will concentrate in the analysis on religious behaviours.

⁴⁸ It should not be taken as a lack of female religiosity, however, due to the commonly held belief amongst many Muslims that it is preferable for women to pray at home.

⁴⁹ Each of the five daily prayers is expected to be prayed during certain time periods. For example, the *fajr* prayer—also known as *subh*—is prayed between dawn and sunrise. If a person prays the prayer after the expected time, they are considered to have prayed it ‘late’.

⁵⁰ *Dhikr* ‘remembrance’ is formalised as repetitive chanting, and can be silent or vocalised.

⁵¹ Rachel Woodlock, “Many Hijabs: Interpretative Approaches to the Questions of Islamic Female Dress”, in *The Sociology of Islam: Secularism, Economy and Politics*, ed. Tugrul Keskin, Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2011, pp. 395–417; Anne Aly and David Walker, “Veiled Threats: Recurrent Cultural Anxieties in Australia”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2007, pp. 203–214; Pnina Werbner, “Veiled Interventions in Pure Space: Honour, Shame and Embodied Struggles among Muslims in Britain and France”, *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2007, pp. 161–186.

⁵² A style of full body and face covering specific to parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is now colloquially used in Western discourse to refer to Islamic face-veiling.

⁵³ A *shaykh* is a respected religious elder or teacher. *Shaykha* is the female version of the title.

⁵⁴ Although ‘fundamentalist’ is often merely a pejorative label, it is used here in the sense described by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby’s *The Fundamentalism Project*, <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/series/FP.html>.

⁵⁵ These four orientations were drawn from the more complex typology provided in Abdullah Saeed, “Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempt at a Classification”, *The Muslim World*, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007, pp. 395–404, of legalist traditionalists; theological puritans; militant extremists; political Islamists; secular liberals; cultural nominalists; classical modernists; and progressive *ijtihādīs*. See also: Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “Tradition as a Modality of Change: Islamic Examples”, in *Religion and Change: ASSR anniversary volume, History of Religions*, Vol. 25, No. 4, May 1986, pp. 318–340; Bruce B. Lawrence, *Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence*, Series Eds. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998; Jacques Waardenburg, *Muslims as Actors: Islamic Meanings and Muslim Interpretations in the Perspective of the Study of Religions*, General Ed. Jacques Waardenburg, *Religion and Reason*, Vol. 46, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007; and Rachel Woodlock, “The *Masjid* is for Men: Competing Voices in the Debate about Australian Muslim Women’s Access to Mosques”, *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010, pp. 51–60.

⁵⁶ This is probably because *‘asr* is the prayer most likely to conflict with work schedules.